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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 08/02/2011

Accident number: 595

Accident time: 10:27

Accident Date: 09/04/2010

Where it occurred: MF:
1/11105/1626/5471,
Qalai Saman Village,
QaraBagh District,
Parwan Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 20/05/2010

ID original source: OPS/14/08

Name of source: UMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 08/02/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate equipment (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
pressure to work quickly (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a “Lessons
Learned” summary provided as a PDF file. The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some
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of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be
revised as more information becomes available.
The cover letter and Lessons Learned summary are reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan, UNMACA
File: OPS/14/08
To: See Distribution List
Signed: [Name removed] Chief of Operations UNMACA, Kabul
Ref# 104
Date: 20th May 2010
Subject: investigation Report & Lessons Learned of [Demining group] DT# 23 Demining
Accident
Attached please find the investigation report and Lessons Learned of Demining Accident,
which occurred on 09 April 2010 at 10:27 Hrs in Qalai Saman Village, QaraBagh District of
Parwan Province.
Best regards,
Distribution List
Complete Investigation Report to: [Demining group]
Lessons Learned to:
MDC, RONCO, OMAR, MCPA, DDG, ATC, JMAS, PM/WRA, HDI, DAFA, AGMA, EODT,
ACL, CMCC, MTI, NDSS, PSS, UXB, AMACs (7).
For Information: MACCA, Chief of Staff DMC, Director, Operations Staff

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-23 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Centre and internal investigation team by
[Demining group] to investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] the de-miner of
[Demining group] DT-23. The accident occurred at 10:27 on 09 April 2010 at minefield
number 1/11105/1626/[Demining group]5471, located in Qalai Saman village, Qarabagh
district of Parwan province.
SUMMARY:
MF # [Demining group] 5471 is contaminated by anti-personnel PMN/MPN 2 mines recorded
by [Demining group] on 2 Dec 2008 and then polygon surveyed by [Demining group] survey
teams. The Russian troops and their successor government planted mines in this area to
protect their positions from the attacks of Mujahidin.
Total area of this task is 42,700sqm and [Demining group] has started demining clearance
operations there on March 2010. So far they cleared 11,136sqm and found/destroyed 9 AP
mines. Totally four accident had happened there as, three on human and one on animal in the
past.
On 9th April 2010 at 10:27 while [the Victim] was working in his clearance lane, busy in
excavation drill, the accident happened and caused severe injuries to his right hand
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(traumatic amputation) and some minor injuries to his neck and nose. His visor was broken
down and separated from headband. As per the investigation report, the deminer has
breached the SOPs as dug directly down on top of the mine. It is also possible that he tried to
work in a bit hurry to increase the progress. As he was fully dressed with PPE, therefore,
remained save from other severe injuries.
CONCLUSIONS:
Carelessness of the victim deminer caused the accident, as he started excavation with his
chisel directly on the top of mine.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
However [Demining group] has taken required actions and distributed lessons learned from
this accident investigation to all their teams. But the following points are to be considered by
all demining teams:
A. The de-miners should not be allowed to work in hurry to achieve the target, if it was not
achievable with normal work.
B. The deminers should pinpoint the signal and then start prodding and excavation as per
procedures and the command group should strongly control them.

Victim Report
Victim number: 779

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Long visor

Protection used: Short vest

Short frontal vest

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES:minor Face; minor Neck
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Hand
COMMENT
"severe injuries to his right hand (traumatic amputation) and some minor injuries to his neck
and nose". No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field Control Inadequacy” because the
Victim’s facial injuries imply that he was working with his visor raised and this error was not
corrected. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the demining
group’s body-armour PPE does not include a collar that interfaces with the visor and stops
blast getting beneath the visor (despite the requirements of IMAS 10.30).

3

Typical frontal apron used by this demining group.
While it is unlikely that the visor would have twisted and “broken down” if worn correctly, it is
possible that the frontal body armour channeled the blast beneath the visor and caused
unusual damage. The hand-tool “chisel” was also in breach of IMAS 10.30 and placed his
hand too close to the blast so that a traumatic amputation occurred, so it was also
“Inadequate equipment”. Because both the PPE and the hand-tool are “approved” by the
UNMACCA, severe Management Control Inadequacies extend to that control group.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
also in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS which they are required to apply. The
summary of the accident seems to accept the demining group’s internal investigation without
question, but its presence implies that a full and comprehensive accident investigation was
made, although not made available for others to learn from.
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